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This inaugural lecture examines the role of ‘faith’ and ‘fact’ in the treatment and assessment of international criminal courts, through 
four core themes (‘effectiveness’, ‘fairness’, ‘fact-finding’, and legacy’) addressed in Andre Gide’s version of the parable of The Return of 
the Prodigal Son. It argues that, in its ‘homecoming’, international criminal justice would benefit from a greater degree of realism by 
openly accepting its limitations and embracing its expressivist function. It cautions at the same time against exclusively quantitative 
understandings of impact, arguing that the power of international courts and tribunals lies not so much in their quantitative record as 
in their role in setting a moral or legal example or shaping discourse. It concludes that a better match between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ 
requires greater attention to the interplay between ‘international’, ‘domestic’, and ‘local’ responses to conflict, as well as recognition of 
their legitimate differences.
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1. Introduction*
Father: My son, why did you leave me? 
Prodigal son: I felt too clearly that the House is not the en-
tire Universe. 
Mother: What were you looking for? 
Prodigal son: I looked for … who I am.
Andre Gide, The Return of the Prodigal Son (1907)
Rector Magnificus, dear Members of the University Board, Dean 
of the Law Faculty, Dean of Campus The Hague, Your Excellen-
cies, distinguished colleagues and friends, 
31 October marks ‘Halloween’ and ‘Reformation Day’. It is thus 
tempting to relate an address to a story. The choice is between 
a ‘ghost story’ and a ‘biblical’ narrative. I chose a midway. I will 
do so by addressing the theme of my lecture through a liter-
ary narrative, namely this dialogue from the parable of The 
Return of the Prodigal Son. The dialogue is part of Andre Gide’s 
version of Luke’s Gospel.1 The theme of ‘homecoming’ itself 
is famously depicted in art history, perhaps most notably in 
Rembrandt’s work.2 Gide’s treatment is distinct because it por-
trays the journey of the son less as a ‘loss’ and more as a ‘quest’ 
for identity. In this sense, the parable depicts perhaps better 
than other images the contemporary status quo of internation-
al criminal justice. Its form also represents the idea of timeless-
ness - a virtue that I have come to appreciate in scholarship. 
Why is this parable so pertinent? International criminal justice 
is at a turning point. In the first half of the twentieth century, 
it embarked on its journey. It has been vested with some inher-
ent faith and capital, and some historical heritage.3 It has gone 
through a series of experiments in the first half of the twen-
tieth century. We have seen a multiplication of international 
justice mechanisms over the past decades, encompassing truly 
international, hybrid, or internationalized institutions. On this 
journey, international criminal justice has witnessed a growing 
emancipation from related branches of law4 or established legal 
traditions.5 Like the ‘prodigal son’, our object of inquiry has 
made its first trial and errors. It has spent considerable capi-
tal, and has lost some initial credit on the way. Now, there is a 
growing sense that the time of experiments is over.
The ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
are defining their closure strategy. The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) is about to close after the Charles Taylor trial. 
Proceedings in other situations are gradually taken on by spe-
cialized entities and states. The International Criminal Court 
(ICC) is about to complete its long-awaited first trial. Domes-
tic legal systems are gradually facing the burden of investiga-
tion and prosecution, by virtue of the principle of complemen-
tarity. In a nutshell, international criminal justice is about to 
return to its normative ‘home’,6 which lies in the space between 
traditional areas of international law (i.e. general public inter-
national law, international humanitarian law, and international 
human rights law) and domestic jurisdiction. 
As in the parable, this ‘homecoming’ creates some fear and 
uncertainty. It causes curiosity, affection, and critical reflec-
tion. What should we make of this journey? What was the 
original cause of the departure? Was it worth it? And, more 
fundamentally, how can we build a better common ground for 
understanding, and facilitate dialogue and acceptance in the 
process of ‘homecoming’ among distinct family members in 
the house? Views range from loyalty or admiration to scepti-
cism and deception.
The process of ‘homecoming’ is connected to an ongoing 
search for the identity of international criminal justice and its 
‘constituency’. Queries such as ‘What are tribunals here for?’ or 
‘How we can assess whether they actually make a difference?’ 
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have largely remained unanswered since the international 
‘justice cascade’7 of the 1990s and the establishment of the 
ICC in 2003. In recent years, different working models have 
been developed by the ICC (developed by the presidency, the 
prosecutor, and the registrar) to assess capacity. The Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the SCSL are developing criteria to determine their own 
‘legacy’.8 There is growing empirical research on the goals and 
effects of international criminal trials in terms of deterrence, 
fact-finding, or sentencing.9 But there remains a fundamental 
tension between ‘faith’ (i.e. belief in the value and worthiness 
of the project) and ‘facts’ (i.e. actual and demonstrable record). 
In particular, the fundamental question as to how and by what 
standards one should assess success or failure remains unan-
swered. International criminal justice is still partly in search of 
its ‘identity’.10
As in the Gospel, there is no space here to provide a compre-
hensive account of successes or failures of the journey itself 
- this is primarily a task for historians. I will focus on the pro-
cess of ‘homecoming’ and reactions to it. As Gide shows in his 
rendition of the Gospel (which expands Luke’s original text), it 
is not necessarily the unconditional ‘acceptance’ of the return 
itself or its moral judgement that makes the return a ‘home-
coming’, but rather the dialogue and interaction with others 
and the interplay between ‘faith’ and ‘facts’. 
The particularity of Gide’s treatment of the theme lies in the 
fact that he treats the son as a ‘returning’, rather than as a ‘lost’ 
member of the family, and that he adds additional dialogues 
to the classical biblical text. He includes conversations with the 
mother and the youngest brother, in addition to the father and 
the elder brother. In Gide’s version, the younger brother him-
self is considering departing from ‘home’: ‘I am leaving before 
the end of the night, Tonight, this night, as soon as it grows 
pale …. I have girded my loins. Tonight I have kept on my san-
dals’ (p. 233).11 The mother seeks to prevent the departure of 
the younger brother through the conversation with the ‘return-
ing’ son: ‘Tell him what disappointment you met on your way. 
Spare him’ (p. 221). 
Each of these conversations provides a different perspective 
on the reasons for departure and return. Gide contrasts the 
biblical dialectic between sin, mercy, and forgiveness by mo-
tive analysis and reason. When asked by the younger brother 
whether he felt that he did wrong, the ‘prodigal son’ explains 
his return by his physical condition, rather than guilt or re-
morse. He says that he was duty-bound to leave, that he ‘suf-
fered’, and that this ‘made’ him ‘reflect’ (p. 227). It is this syn-
ergetic and non-apologetic treatment of the interplay between 
‘reason’, ‘faith’, and pragmatism that marks the modernity and 
strength of the text.
This vision reflects the unanswered relationship between ‘faith’ 
and ‘facts’ in the history of international criminal justice.12 
In the 1940s and 1990s, the turn to international courts and 
tribunals started largely as a ‘faith-based’ project.13 Although 
it was officially presented as a product of ‘reason’,14 it was born 
partly out of hope, necessity, and lack of alternatives. ‘Faith’ 
and ‘morality’ were closely intertwined.15 The atrocities com-
mitted during the Second World War were seen as attacks on 
human identity. At Nuremberg, it was predominantly Ameri-
can ‘faith’ in the judicial culture that prevailed over British plea 
for summary executions of Nazi leaders.16 The US Prosecutor 
at Nuremberg, Justice Robert Jackson, made this point dis-
tinctly in his Opening Statement for the Prosecution before 
the tribunal, noting that ‘[t]he common sense of mankind 
demands that law shall not stop with the punishment of petty 
crimes by little people’. 
In 1998, Secretary-General Annan spoke of the ICC as a ‘gift 
of hope’ when the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998.17 This 
reflected a common sentiment that international courts ‘do 
good’ and the strong ‘faith’ of civil society in the project that 
was fundamental for its development. In the absence of better 
information, international criminal courts were assessed on 
7Between ‘faith’ and ‘facts’  
the basis of the ‘values’ and preferences that they represent.18 It 
was popular to rely on ‘fictions’ that embody a ‘shared identity’. 
International criminal courts comfortably accepted render-
ing decisions on behalf of the ‘international community’ as 
a whole.19 There was strong support for the idea of the jus 
cogens nature of international crime prohibitions.20 Several 
of the first judgements (Tadić, Akayesu, and Blaškić) received 
almost unanimous blessing and acceptance by states. Some of 
the more problematic aspects of the practice of international 
tribunals (i.e. concerns regarding the principle of legality, le-
gal certainty, evidence, and the presumption of innocence or 
equality of arms)21 were sidelined by the enthusiasm of the vic-
tim-centred and prosecution-driven human rights movement, 
which saw - to borrow the imagery of Judge Christine Van den 
Wyngaert - its traditional (human rights) ‘shield’ reinforced by 
a new ‘sword’ (of criminal justice).22 During this ‘honeymoon 
period’, international criminal courts became the symbols of a 
secular ‘culture of faith’23 in a similar way to human rights be-
coming ‘yardsticks’ of the progress of humanity.24
Today, we are witnessing a shift in a different direction. We are 
used to the presence of international criminal courts. The idea 
of ‘faith’ (i.e. trust that does not rest on proof or evidence) has 
become unpopular in international discourse and the ‘DNA’ 
of The Hague. International justice is increasingly treated as a 
rational and fact-driven project, with a strong sense of agnosti-
cism. One is reminded of the words of the ‘doubting’ Apostle 
Thomas in the face of resurrection (‘Except I shall see … I will 
not believe’25). ‘Idealism’ has been partly overtaken by ‘real-
ism’.26 There is often an obsession with numbers, be it as part 
of conflict statistics (e.g. on contextual elements of crimes, vic-
tim numbers) or court evidence. The strength of international 
tribunals (i.e. their role as agents of global justice) has partly 
turned into a weakness. With growing budgets and increasing 
interference of international tribunals with sovereignty inter-
ests and domestic jurisdiction, the very process of criminal 
adjudication has taken on ‘transactional’ features. 
In today’s judicial landscape, courts are no longer exclusively 
legal agents, but are also employers,27 service providers, nego-
tiators, and communicative agencies. International criminal 
justice has, to some extent, become a justice ‘industry’28 - some 
speak of the ‘business’ of international justice. With this, new 
methods, technologies, and models of accountability have en-
tered the field. It is common to assess performance and valid-
ity of courts against quantitative or technical criteria, such as 
economic cost-benefit analysis and rational source allocation.29 
Institutions face burdensome budgetary control and audit pro-
cedures. They are bound to ‘quantify’ and validate their perfor-
mance in numbers, even in areas in which results are difficult 
to quantify or measure.30 At the same time, many of the facts 
gathered in investigations are never used at trial. 
This move towards facts and quantification is partly a natural 
phenomenon. It is a logical consequence of the extension of 
the mandate of international jurisdictions, which encompasses 
a diversity of functions: the ‘core judicial’ mandate (i.e. trial 
and prosecution), administrative duties, as well outreach and 
diplomacy (e.g. negotiation, co-operation).31 But it poses at the 
same time novel risks for the international judiciary. It imposes 
onerous and expensive duties of data collection and analysis on 
institutions, as well as heavy reporting obligations. When taken 
to the extreme, such scrutiny may actually impede the actual 
problem-solving capacity of courts. The most evident example 
is the impact of budgetary control on selection of cases and 
number of proceedings.32 It is thus critical to take a fresh look 
at the use and organization of factual knowledge in interna-
tional justice. 
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2. Beyond ‘faith’ versus ‘facts’
I would argue that the assessment of the ‘homecoming’ of in-
ternational criminal justice may require greater differentiation 
in the use of ‘faith’ and ‘facts’. The assumption of ‘faith’ appears 
to go against the very nature and the rational foundation of the 
legal process. But the two concepts are in fact complementary, 
rather than competing, factors, not only in the history of ideas, 
but also in actual practice. I would like to make a threefold 
argument:
1. First, there may be a need for a greater degree of real-
ism (i.e. a better factual understanding of international 
criminal justice) in order to assess its strengths and weak-
nesses. It is fundamental to move from a ‘faith’-based to a 
‘fact’-based vision, and to refine methods of assessment in 
order to achieve a better scientific grounding of the disci-
pline. This will reduce unrealistic expectations. 
2.  At the same time, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
limitations of facts and empirical assessment. Not all 
outcomes of international criminal justice can be reliably 
assessed or quantified. Any investigation and prosecution 
carry a certain degree of uncertainty.33 To require ‘ab-
solute certainty’ is neither always necessary34 nor always 
desirable.35 In fact, one of the most important virtues of 
international criminal justice may actually lie in the fact 
that it upholds normative values and idealism. 
3. The key to solving contemporary dilemmas is thus not 
always a drive for ultimate clarity, predictability, or meas-
urable outcomes. Rather, the main challenge is to define 
acceptable limits (e.g. ‘tolerable doubt’) and to develop 
techniques to manage these limitations in a way that is 
best compatible with the goals of international criminal 
justice. This requires a fresh perspective on the interplay 
between different levels: the ‘international’, the ‘national’, 
and the ‘local’. 
 
I will illustrate this argument in several steps. I will start with 
an analysis of the ‘identity’ of international courts and tribu-
nals (section 2.1). Then, I will move towards an assessment 
of the benefits and limits of ‘faith’-based and ‘fact’-based ap-
proaches in four core areas that form part of its current justifi-
cation (section 2.2). I will then offer some thoughts as to how 
the dichotomy between ‘faith’ and ‘fact’ can be approached in 
order to facilitate ‘homecoming’ (section 3). 
2.1. ‘Homecoming’ and ‘identity’
Let us start with a stocktaking of ‘identity’ and return to our 
plot. In the parable, this issue is taken up by the returning son 
in his answer to the question of why he left and what distin-
guishes him from family members who stayed in the house. In 
Gide’s treatment, the answer of the son differs in relation to 
the respective interlocutor. The answer to the father and the 
law-abiding brother is rather short, and focused on differentia-
tion. The returning son answers the father: ‘Because the House 
shut me in’ (p. 205). He tells the elder brother, who lived by 
the traditional ‘order’: ‘[W]e aren’t very much alike’ (p. 209); 
‘It was exaltation which I also sought and found in the desert’ 
(p. 211); ‘I could not help imaging other cultures, other lands 
and roads’ (p. 211). The most honest explanation is given to 
the inquiring mother’s ‘What were you looking for?’: ‘I looked 
for … who I am’ (p. 217).
This situation bears some resemblance to the contemporary 
reality of international judicial institutions. Institutionally, 
international courts are comparatively new entities. As in the 
case of our returning son, there are impediments to full ‘do-
mestic acceptance’. International criminal courts often enjoy 
a lesser degree of acceptance, due to their detachment from 
domestic constituencies and their partial deviation from do-
mestic traditions and legal cultures. Even more than domestic 
courts, which can look back at a grown ‘judicial’ tradition, they 
have to conquer recognition and acceptance.36 
Moreover, their raison d’être is not static, but developed 
through dialogue with, and in distinction from, other entities. 
There is no common agreement across tribunals on a cluster 
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of primary and secondary ‘goals’ of international criminal jus-
tice. The determination of goals and priorities depends on the 
mandate and varies even inside the same institution according 
to the respective stage of existence. In scientific literature, there 
are as many opinions as voices on the selection, definition 
(e.g. direct/indirect), or distinction (e.g. primary/secondary) 
of specific goals.37 In his 2004 report on the ‘Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies’, the 
UN Secretary-General outlined a list of broadly defined goals. 
These include: retribution (i.e. bringing responsible perpetra-
tors to justice), ending violations and preventing their recur-
rence, ‘securing justice and dignity for victims’, establishing 
‘a record of past events’, promoting national ‘reconciliation’, 
‘re-establishing the rule of law’, and contributing to the ‘resto-
ration of peace’.38 The first two goals are common to domestic 
legal systems, while the other goals (i.e. fact-finding and ‘social 
transformation’) are more particular to international criminal 
justice as a discipline.39 
But both the selection and the practical application of these 
goals remain highly controversial. For instance, some sug-
gest that the mandate of international courts should remain 
restricted to classical criminal justice aims.40 Others concede 
that domestic criminal-law goals may require adjustment in 
an international context and that there might be modest space 
for broader ‘transformative’ goals, even as secondary goals. In 
most situations, individual goals conflict with each other.41 
The debate of arrest warrants against acting heads of state (e.g. 
Omar Al Bashir, Muammar Gaddafi)42 shows that the most im-
mediate challenge is to prioritize among competing preroga-
tives, to manage a proper sequencing of proceedings (e.g. tim-
ing) or to determine accountability forums in a way that takes 
into context and conflicting interests. There is, in particular, a 
deeper friction between a security-oriented, a human rights-
based, and a more traditional criminal justice-oriented reading 
of mandates.43 For instance, some argue that ‘incapacitation’ of 
perpetrators or extremist elements might form part of the re-
tributive or ‘peace-building’-related functions of international 
criminal courts,44 whilst others express doubts about whether 
extra-juridical motives could be part of the legitimate or pri-
mary goals of criminal justice.45 Moreover, the prioritization of 
goals may shift gradually over time in line with the progression 
of the mandate of the relevant institution.46
International criminal justice is thus, to some extent, founded 
on a paradox. It is grounded partly in classical domestic and 
partly in international objectives. It may have to deal even 
more than other branches of law with a functional problem of 
‘goal’ variety and ‘goal ambiguity’.47
2.2. The ‘assessment’ paradox
What, then, are valid parameters of assessment? Does it mean 
there can be no valid standards of assessment, since the respec-
tive outcomes cannot be reliably related to concrete goals or 
since there are hardly any viable projects with which interna-
tional criminal justice can be easily compared?
I would argue that international criminal justice cannot be 
properly assessed without a better understanding of the in-
terplay between ‘faith’48 and ‘fact’.49 There are some general 
denominators against which performance can be assessed. But 
a proper evaluation requires factual and normative judgement 
that is partly grounded in moral argument. I will illustrate this 
argument with respect to four themes that form part of the 
contemporary framework of assessing ‘success’ and ‘failure’ 
of international criminal courts: ‘effectiveness’, ‘fairness’, ‘fact-
finding’, and ‘legacy’. 
These themes reflect roughly the different perspectives that 
the returning son faces in the questions and encounters with 
different family members upon his return. As in the parable, 
existing deficiencies may not necessarily reflect individual in-
stitutional failure, but rather illustrate broader limitations of 
the discipline. 
2.2.1. Effectiveness
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Let us first examine effectiveness. This theme is of cardinal 
importance in the parable. The argument of ‘effectiveness’ is 
brought up in the conversation between the son and the father. 
The father seeks to understand the rationality of journey and 
to assess it in terms of economic viability. He asks: ‘Why did 
you, the heir, the son, escape from the house?’; ‘All that fortune 
you took away, you have spent recklessly?’ (p. 205); ‘Then, what 
made you come back, tell me?’ (p. 207). The ‘prodigal son’ re-
plies: ‘At the cost of all my goods, I bought fervor’ (p. 207). The 
father accepts him back at the house despite his spending.
How about international criminal justice? Should we also con-
tinue to accept it despite its apparent flaws related to the cost, 
selectivity, and pace of proceedings? Perhaps because there are 
no better alternatives?
Today, it is almost a ‘cliché that international justice moves too 
slowly, and is too costly’.50 Proceedings before international 
criminal courts count without doubt among the most expen-
sive cases in terms of costs per defendant.51 The United Na-
tions, the Assembly of States Parties, and even individual judges 
have criticized the ‘glacial’ speed of some proceedings, and the 
significant delays in bringing suspects to trial.52 The ICTY, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the 
SCSL have faced deadlines for completion, but went on to re-
vise their schedule on an annual basis. The ICC had to adjust its 
anticipated number of investigations and trials almost routinely 
since its inception. Despite various amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, and different expert recommendations 
to expedite proceedings,53 cases such as the Milošević or the 
Lubanga trial have become reminders of the downsides of the 
typical pace of international criminal courts. 
Doubts and criticisms about the ‘pace’ of proceedings (e.g. fears 
that ‘justice delayed’ means ‘justice denied’) are partly justi-
fied. There are a number of areas in which the institutional 
architecture of international criminal justice may be in need of 
procedural reform: these include, inter alia, the relationship be-
tween pre-trial and trial, the scope54 and use55 of live testimony, 
the timing of disclosure,56 the use of interlocutory appeals,57 
judicial management (e.g. assignment of judges, length of deci-
sions),58 or interpretation/translation. In the context of the ICC, 
the Assembly of States Parties even went so far as to establish a 
study group on governance, which quickly turned to the theme 
of ‘efficiency and effectiveness of the Court’.59 But there is at the 
same time a need to reflect more fundamentally on the stand-
ards by which international criminal courts are assessed. Only 
a refined methodology allows a differentiated assessment of 
‘myths’ and facts.
2.2.1.1. The dilemma of comparison. There is, first of all, a 
need to specify adequate objects of comparison. The cost and 
speed of international proceedings are often assessed against 
the benchmark of ‘domestic’ proceedings. Mark Drumbl, for 
instance, has argued that the best way to ‘move from faith to 
science’ is to ‘treat the institutions that enforce international 
criminal law as subjects of study in the same way that domes-
tic scholars treat domestic courts’.60 The domestic analogy, 
however, is partly misleading.61 Similarly to our returning son, 
international criminal proceedings share specific features that 
distinguish them from domestic members of the judicial family. 
A mere numeric assessment (i.e. of the number of defendants 
or cases, the defendant/cost ratio, or the length of investigations 
or trials) is too simplistic. A comparative survey of the length 
of proceedings shows that timing is influenced by a number of 
factors that are partly distinct to international criminal justice. 
The factors include, inter alia, the scope and complexity of the 
charges, the level of responsibility of the defendant, the number 
of suspects, and the number of motions filed.62 It is thus mis-
guided to compare the length of investigations or the trial sta-
tistics to traditional domestic cases. In fact, a more appropriate 
comparative may be transnational crime cases. In this context, 
it is not unusual that proceedings take between five and eight 
years from investigation to completion, due to their complex-
ity.63
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2.2.1.2. Goal relevance. More fundamentally, the assessment 
of the pace of proceedings needs to be placed in perspective in 
relation to the distinct goals of international criminal justice. 
This context sheds a different light on the assessment of time 
frames and performance.
This is shown by a recent comparative empirical study on the 
length of proceedings, based on a record of 307 cases adjudi-
cated by international and hybrid courts by mid-2009. The 
study (undertaken by a former ICTY staff member) takes 
into account the pre-trial phase, the trial phase, and possible 
appeals. It comes to the astonishing conclusion that the ac-
tual pace of proceedings is less dramatic from a comparative 
perspective than conventional wisdom suggests, and that in-
ternational cases are only ‘modestly slower’ that complex cases 
in domestic settings.64 The study shows that cases at the ICTY 
or the SCSL have, in general, progressed at a ‘reasonable pace’ 
once defendants were in custody, namely in a time frame of 
‘four to five years per defendant from custody to completion’ - 
a period that is ‘on par with the timeframes for complex crimi-
nal cases in developed Western countries’.65 The only exception 
is the ICTR, where the period from custody to completion 
has taken significantly longer, namely ‘5.9 years’ on average.66 
Delays have been influenced by a number of factors, includ-
ing those that are only partly attributable to international 
courts, such as the delays in arrest and the subsequent need for 
amendment of indictments/charges or long periods of deten-
tion prior to transfer/surrender.67 
Of course, this record is deplorable and in need of perfection. 
Delays in investigation often impede the collection and quality 
of evidence, cause disillusion among victims, or contribute to 
prolongation of human suffering. Delays in prosecution (e.g. 
pre-trial detention without charge) compromise the rights of 
defendants and may actually cause detainees to be perceived as 
martyrs68 - as evidenced by the ‘show trial’ character of some 
proceedings.69 But the study shows that the overall record of 
international criminal courts cannot be reliably assessed from 
the point of view of effectiveness without taking surrounding 
factors into account. Operational mechanics, such as the dif-
ficulty in obtaining evidence, the time between commission of 
offence and apprehension, the establishment of context, and 
crime linkage are crucial in the consideration of the relevant 
object of comparison. 
More fundamentally, the overall assessment of effectiveness 
shifts if pace is assessed in relation to not only criminal adjudi-
cation, but also other contributions of international criminal 
justice, such as fact-finding, the establishment of a record, or 
transformative goals. A figure of four to five years may appear 
long for a trial, but it is less threatening if it is associated with 
a broader process of clarification of historical facts. In some 
instances, it may even be wise to postpone charges from an 
effectiveness point of view, in order to gradually build lines 
of responsibility or to improve the accuracy of charges or the 
completeness of justice.70 The passage of time may thus, in 
some circumstances, represent an asset and result in a better 
pursuit of justice.71 Some of the purported ‘transformative’ 
goals, such as capacity building or reconciliation, cannot be 
reached without longer-term engagement, since they are con-
tingent on recovery and stabilization. The weighing of these 
goals may force international criminal courts to balance the 
‘desire for expediency’ with the ‘need for time’, in order to se-
cure an effective impact over time. 
In our parable, individual family members and the father, in 
particular, recognize these observational dilemmas gradually 
in their conversation. They realize the difficulty of compari-
son and come to understand the complexity of the goals of 
journey. This changes their judgement of the return. A similar 
picture is emerging in the assessment of the record of inter-
national criminal justice. It has become evident that it is too 
simple to judge effectiveness by statistical trial figures or by 
the success or failure of individual cases. A proper assessment 
requires a fuller and more nuanced matrix, which identifies ap-
propriate object of comparison and relates facts to individual 
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goals and resources.72 Researchers are just beginning to develop 
such frameworks with respect to individual tribunals, such as 
the ICTY.73 They need to be improved and extended to other 
courts, in order to gain a more realistic and credible account 
of effectiveness and cost–benefit in relation to international 
criminal justice as a whole. 
2.2.1.3. Limits. At the same time, it is evident that not all goals 
of international criminal justice can be fully quantified or 
translated into concrete indicators and measurable outcomes. 
This dilemma is exemplified by the reply of the returning son 
to the father: ‘I changed your gold into pleasures, your precepts 
into fantasy, my chastity into poetry, and my austerity into 
desires’ (p. 207). 
Traditional budgetary logic reaches its limits when it comes 
to the justification of the funding of international criminal 
courts. Today, many government agencies use cost-benefit 
analysis to justify public expenditure.74 Generally, cost-benefit 
analysis consists of a comparison of the cost of the investment 
with the value of the harm avoided (i.e. the intended benefit). 
This methodology encounters difficulties in the justification 
of the budget of international criminal courts.75 The intended 
benefits are difficult to quantify. It does injustice to interna-
tional courts to judge effectiveness merely by a number of 
visible and quantitative outcomes, such as the number of cases 
or decisions that they render. In this sense, the by-now famous 
statement of the first ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo 
that ‘success’ cannot be measured by the ‘number of trials’76 
carries some wisdom. Some of the most important effects, 
such as the monitoring and denouncement of violations or the 
catalytic effect on domestic proceedings, are actually largely 
independent of the record of cases. 
Other contributions, such as norm development or the spin-
over effects across international institutions, are qualitative in 
nature. Budgetary contributions are thus rather an investment 
into a ‘justice’ system, based on prediction and adherence to a 
‘common’ system of goals, or the benefits related to this asso-
ciation,77 than a strict comparison of ambitions and outcomes 
of a specific institution. Bert Röling and the late Judge Antonio 
Cassese have reminded us of this when arguing that the ‘[t]
he principal purpose and function of criminal law … is not 
that occasionally a criminal should be sentenced. The very 
function of criminal law is to strengthen and fortify moral 
opinions’.78 Whether the specific organization or ‘system’ meets 
its self-proclaimed or externally set goals through outputs (e.g. 
decisions, outreach) is largely a normative assessment.79 It car-
ries with it a large degree of uncertainty and might ultimately 
not even adequately explain the reasons for adherence/non-
adherence.80 
Perhaps the best illustration of the limits of cost-benefit 
analysis is the ongoing debate about prevention and deter-
rence. No institution is actually discarding this rationale in its 
toolbox of proclaimed goals but, again, none of the existing 
courts has managed to prove that it has actually created im-
pact. As we know from domestic criminal law, the very argu-
ment that international criminal proceedings deter potential 
abusers is based on speculation. The logic of deterrence relies 
on a hypothesis. Specific deterrence relies on the fiction that 
lawyers can ‘read the mind’ of perpetrators and that rational 
cost-benefit determines the behaviour of defendants. General 
deterrence relies on the broader demonstration effect of crimi-
nal justice and changes in the perception of costs/risks more 
generally. Both theories entail a great degree of uncertainty, i.e. 
faith in the logic of the model of deterrence.81 
There are some indicators of success. International criminal 
justice may improve the degree of ‘threat’, since it increases 
the probability of ‘punishment’.82 Proponents point towards 
greater ‘compliance rates’ with human rights decisions/moni-
toring83 or a correlation between ‘justice’ threats and crime 
statistics in individual situations.84 But examples such as 
Milošević’s campaign in Kosovo or Joseph Kony’s continuing 
atrocities in the Great Lakes Region indicate that there are still 
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at least as many counterfactuals. Hardly any empirical study 
has managed to demonstrate impact credibly and to trace clear 
patterns of causation and weigh intermediate causes.85 There 
is a thin line between rational criminal policy and moral justi-
fication.86 The impact of international criminal courts may lie 
more in contribution to a larger ‘culture in which humanitarian 
law and human rights law are better integrated in the fabric of 
society and therefore adhered to more’.87 International criminal 
justice may thus not necessarily stop violations. It rather adds 
constraints and influences attitudes towards their disapproval 
or acceptance. 
An overambitious reliance on the presumed impact of deter-
rence can sometimes even be detrimental to the overall goal 
of effectiveness. A recent example is the increasing opening 
of preliminary examinations at the ICC, without subsequent 
investigation. To make an active use of proprio motu powers is 
a priori desirable from a point of view of prevention. But, if the 
monitoring of multiple situations is not followed by further 
action or is unlikely to result in any visible ‘sanction’ (e.g. due 
to capacity restraints or lack of ‘gravity’), it may actually reduce 
the impact or threat of the ICC on the long run, since it de-
creases leverage.88
Ultimately, we may thus sometimes be better off if we accept 
these limitations more openly,89 since it would avoid unrealistic 
expectations - just like the father in our parable, who admits the 
limits of his comprehension (‘I was waiting for you at the end 
of the road. If you had called me … I was there’ (p. 209)) before 
accepting the son back at the house (‘Go now. Go back to the 
room I had prepared for you. Enough for today. Rest’ (p. 209)). 
2.2.2. Fairness
Let us now examine fairness (i.e. the second central theme asso-
ciated with the process of ‘homecoming’) and its assessment.
In the parable, the argument of ‘fairness’ is represented by 
the elder brother. In contrast to the father, the elder brother 
is the guardian of order in the house (‘he who makes the law’ 
(p. 209)). He stresses the importance of rules in the commu-
nity and confronts the returning son with the question of ‘fair 
treatment’ in terms of the ‘what if ’ question: ‘Think what could 
have happened if, like you, I had deserted our Father’s House. 
Servants and thieves would have pillaged all of our goods. My 
brother, indiscipline is over’ (p. 213). This argument is linked 
to the call for ‘equal treatment’. It contrasts with the more 
‘reconciliatory’ logic of justice applied by the father and the 
non-material justification offered by the ‘returning son’ (‘the 
House is not the entire universe’ (p. 211); ‘I was catching sight 
of other goods’ (p. 213)). 
This dialectic reflects the both the foundation, as well as the 
dilemmas, of our contemporary system of international crimi-
nal justice. Today, fairness is not only one but perhaps the most 
important justification advanced in support of ‘International 
Criminal Justice’.90 The argument that ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ are 
too precious to be traded off against vengeance and effective 
sanction was at the heart of the creation of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals.91 It has become ever more important since 
then. Richard Goldstone, the first ICTY prosecutor, famously 
argued that the success of international courts should not be 
measured by the number of convictions, but by the fairness of 
the trial.92 The thousands of decisions that international crimi-
nal courts have rendered on issues of substantive and proce-
dural justice are testimony to this.93 
At the same time, ‘fairness’ is difficult to measure. There are 
no clear indicators. The level of ‘fairness’ is predominantly a 
normative judgement. International criminal courts are strug-
gling to strike a balance between a more ‘retributive’ concep-
tion of justice (which emphasizes the vindication social norms 
and rules, procedural fairness, and punishment) and a more 
‘restorative’ vision of justice (which devotes broader attention 
to the needs of victims, offenders, and affected communities). 
Behind this tension lies a deeper conflict behind ‘action’ and 
‘perception’.
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On a formal level, international criminal justice has gone a 
long way in improving fairness. In terms of codification and 
procedure, international criminal law has adopted and devel-
oped some of the most advanced and sophisticated due process 
and fair-trial protections available to defendants in domestic 
systems. The list of guarantees enshrined in judicial docu-
ments not only represents a ‘minimum degree’ of protection, 
but also ascribes to the highest available standards, based on 
international human rights instruments. Some impulses from 
international criminal law have even come to serve as a model 
for adjudication and reform in domestic penal systems.94
As in the field of ‘effectiveness’, there is room for improvement. 
With the gradual extension of the case load at the ICTY and 
the ICC, in fact, both the prosecution and the defence have 
taken issue with matters such as disclosure duties, managerial 
powers of judges, questioning and protection of witnesses, 
standards of evidence, self-representation, or sentencing de-
terminations. In the ICC, the application of victims for par-
ticipation in proceedings is increasingly perceived as a burden 
by all organs of the court (including the registry) and their 
processing is hampered by capacity constraints.95 The two sub-
sequent stays of proceedings in the Lubanga trial have made it 
clear that it remains a delicate choice to determine appropriate 
remedies for abuses of process, including alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct.96 Allocation of defence resources often remains a 
bone of contention. Moreover, procedures and judicial choices 
on core issues often differ among different courts or chambers, 
in the absence of judicial hierarchy.
But, on a broader historical trajectory, the overall record is 
encouraging. There is some progress in terms of transparency 
and on a normative level. Today, every move in the courtroom 
and outside the courtroom is watched. Alleged violations of 
procedural fairness and corresponding remedies are subject 
to intense scrutiny. Hardly any issue escapes the critical eye 
of the increasing number of trial monitors and NGOs (non-
governmental organizations) active in the field.97 Rules and 
procedures are open to amendment and have been adjusted 
frequently. There is ongoing interaction and cross-fertilization 
among different courts and tribunals on ‘due process’ stand-
ards and best ‘judicial practices’.98 ‘Fairness’ has become the 
most prominent justification of international justice among 
courts and institutions, and their distinction from competitive 
forums (e.g. domestic courts, quasi-judicial mechanisms). 
One of the greatest challenges, however, lies in the remaining 
gap between form and perception, and the broader ‘restorative’ 
dimension of justice. Inside tribunals, there is a tendency to 
assess ‘fairness’ predominantly from a ‘normative’ and ‘proce-
dural’ point of view - that is, the fair treatment of participants 
in the process and the equal and unbiased application of 
norms and standards. In reality, however, ‘fairness’ is often as 
much about ‘action’ as it is about ‘perception’. On that front, 
the record of international criminal courts and tribunals is less 
convincing.99
International criminal justice shares striking parallels with our 
parable. Like the choice of the father, it often creates paradoxes 
in the eyes of the ‘affected’ that are difficult to explain from 
the perspective of equality. In non-Western traditions, the very 
transfer of defendants to ‘The Hague’ is often perceived as a 
reward rather than as a punishment by victims, or even de-
fendants, in light of the welfare standards and penalty regimes 
associated with it (penalties, plea-bargaining). Many states, 
and even some defendants, prefer proceedings in The Hague 
over proceedings ‘at home’, due to security and other concerns. 
This choice comes at the price of lesser proximity and access to 
justice by victim communities and a more limited ‘therapeu-
tic’ of proceedings. Core witnesses or information providers, 
including ‘insider’ witnesses (who may have been implicated 
in violence), often benefit from witness-protection schemes or 
health treatments. Many of the immediate victims of crimes, 
particularly those who fall outside the ‘prosecution’ case, are 
left without benefit or recognition. Often, charges remain fo-
cused on specific incidents, crimes, or perpetrators, although 
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others may deserve equal attention. 
These inherent contradictions make international criminal 
justice vulnerable in terms of perception.100 There is no easy 
fix or remedy for these dilemmas. What can be done, however, 
is to provide a better justification and explanation of these 
dilemmas, in order to improve perception. One challenge, 
in particular, runs like a ‘red thread’ through the history of 
international criminal justice from the beginning of the twen-
tieth century until today: the perception of independence (i.e. 
freedom from external interference) and impartiality (i.e. lack 
of bias and investigation of all sides to a conflict). This require-
ment is a key prerequisite of ‘fairness’. Social science research 
indicates that there is a link between the perception of fairness 
of proceedings and ‘views about the appropriate decision-mak-
er’.101 Despite criticism of experiences such as Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, international criminal courts still struggle to reconcile 
selectivity with the perception of independence and impartiali-
ty. Because of the existing resource constraints, it is particularly 
important for these courts to demonstrate ‘impartiality’ and to 
be seen to look at all sides of a conflict equally. 
This balance has not always been reached. The practice of the 
ICC Office of the Prosecutor has been criticized for a lack of 
sustainability and deficiencies related to even-handedness, co-
herence (e.g. chain of command), or explanation of decisions 
not to prosecute in relation to the situations in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic, 
and Darfur.102 Similar risks arise in the context of the Libyan 
situation. SC Resolution 1970, which contains the referral of 
the situation in Libya, was primarily directed towards govern-
mental criminality, by virtue of its reliance on the concept of 
crimes against humanity and its initial focus on Benghazi.103 In 
this situation, as in any other internal armed conflict, it is evi-
dent that only a handful of incidents can be investigated and 
prosecuted. In such circumstances, the challenge and virtue of 
the ICC lie not so much in the number of cases, but rather in 
its approach and in the example that it sets in relation to judi-
cial independence and impartiality, and its ability to withstand 
political pressure.104 
A recent empirical study on victims’ attitudes towards the 
ICTY confirms this dilemma. It comes to the conclusion that 
the perception of fairness in the delivery of justice remained 
largely dictated by group identity and inter-group relations 
- that is, affiliation to ‘defeated’ or ‘defended’ communities, 
rather than standards of ‘procedural fairness’.105 According to 
the study, the tribunal faced difficulties in discarding percep-
tions of bias by Croats and Serbs or instilling the idea that 
each group consists of ‘both offenders and victims’.106 This 
example shows that there is a gap between ‘action’ and ‘percep-
tion’. These contradictions cannot be fully resolved by judicial 
practice alone. But judicial institutions would gain greater 
credibility, and pay better tribute to their mandate, if they pro-
vide greater clarity and transparency in justifying selectivity. 
It is through this ‘demonstration’ and ‘explanation’, more than 
quantitative record, that international criminal courts fulfil 
their key function: to maintain ‘faith’ in law and institutions. 
2.2.3. Fact-finding 
For many people, ‘fairness’ is only one among many other fac-
tors associated with international criminal justice. It is comple-
mented by a search for facts and a hope to grasp at least a short 
moment of justice or part of a larger ‘truth’. 
This vision is presented by the mother in Gide’s version of the 
parable. The figure of the mother is not included in Luke’s 
Gospel. In Gide’s treatment, she combines the process of 
‘homecoming’ with an inquiry for a deeper understanding of 
facts and motives. She wants to know whether the son suffered 
and turns the attention to the experience of the journey. She 
asks: ‘Why did you leave me for such a long time?’ (p. 215); 
‘Never did I give up hoping for you’ (p. 217); ‘Doubtless your 
bed was not made every evening, nor the table set for all your 
meals’ (p. 217); ‘At least did you suffer only from hunger? 
(p. 219).
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This conversation reflects the ongoing dilemma between ‘fact-
finding’ and ‘truth’ in the assessment of international criminal 
proceedings.107 To what extent can international criminal jus-
tice be viably assessed by its contribution to fact-finding?
The expectations are high. In particular, for many victims, con-
crete factual elements, such as the finding and recovery of bod-
ies or the acknowledgment of specific facts,108 are often more 
important than elaborate procedural or legal assessments. 
Many core crimes require the showing of a specific context 
(e.g. systematic or widespread violence109), gravity, or intent 
to harm a group (e.g. genocide, persecution). This means 
that - more than in domestic trials - evidence must go beyond 
the conduct of the defendant and extend to clarification of 
context.110 But the means are limited. There is significant con-
troversy as to whether ‘fact-finding’ and establishment of the 
‘truth’ are ‘ends’ in themselves, rather than ‘means to an end’ in 
rendering justice.111 
The ability of criminal trials to serve as a foundation for his-
tory and memory has formed a bone of contention in inter-
national criminal justice since its first experiments.112 Robert 
Storey, the Executive Trial Counsel at Nuremberg, and later 
Hannah Arendt argued that ‘[t]he purpose of the trial is to ren-
der justice, and nothing else; even the noblest ulterior purposes 
- “the making of a record ...” can only detract from the law’s 
main business: to weigh the charges brought against the ac-
cused, to render judgment and to mete out due punishment’.113
Today, this ‘purist’ understanding is contested. As Lawrence 
Douglas has shown in his study of the Eichmann and Demjan-
juk trials (‘Memory of Judgment’), judicial proceedings some-
times actually mark a tribute to history and memory, in light 
of their specific set-up and orchestration.114 The duty to seek 
the ‘truth’ is inherent in the mandate of judges and sometimes 
an express prosecutorial duty.115 Historical knowledge is often 
used to support evidence. The factual findings of international 
courts and tribunals are increasingly presented as a potential 
basis for restorative purposes (e.g. reconciliation). But, as in 
our parable (in which the account of the facts and the reasons 
for departure differ in relation to the protagonist), there is 
typically not ‘one version’ of facts, or one layer of ‘truth’. Fact-
finding is often a judgement of probability in a criminal pro-
cess, based on competing narratives - and sometimes different 
layers of ‘truth’.116 ‘Historical truth’ and ‘legal truth’ do not 
always coincide.117 This is due to a number of factors that are 
rooted in the structure and methods of criminal investigations 
and prosecutions.
Due to the growing focus of contemporary legal proceedings 
on ‘accountability’, historical facts are often presented selec-
tively.118 Investigation or prosecutions typically cover only a 
part of a specific situation or incident. The selection of facts 
and circumstances presented in proceedings depends largely 
on what the prosecution believes it can prove at trial. Experts 
typically act for a given side. Judges commonly lack a set of 
pre-determined judicial guidelines to assess expert evidence.119 
Therefore, trials often present only a partial reflection of real-
ity. 
Even more importantly, historians and lawyers use different 
methods when assessing facts (e.g. lines of causation, factual 
determinations). International criminal law is about individu-
alizing roles and attributing responsibility. Within this context, 
lawyers are typically inclined to think in terms of hierarchies 
or ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ lines of authority. They seek to 
bring ‘order’ into chaos. They ‘systematize’ patterns of conduct 
and isolate specific events and acts, in order to provide clear 
answers. Historical and social science research enjoys greater 
flexibility. It is open to broader causality models and not neces-
sarily focused on ‘sampled’ facts. This starting point provides 
greater leeway to admit complexity in reasoning and to deal 
more openly with uncertainty and limits in determining ‘what 
actually happened’. These factors distinguish historical and 
judicial fact-finding. 
17
Between ‘faith’ and ‘facts’  
Recently, international criminal courts have faced increasing 
criticism in relation to the uncertain evidentiary founda-
tions of their rulings.120 Since there is often no documented 
record of orders or actions, international trials rely heavily on 
eyewitness testimony. This practice creates practical difficul-
ties. ‘Educational, cultural or linguistic differences’ between 
witnesses and court staff complicate communication and reli-
ability assessments. Judge Patricia Wald put it nicely when she 
said ‘I know no judge in [an international] tribunal who does 
not acknowledge that he or she is totally at the mercy of the 
translator in the courtroom’.121 Not all testimonial deficiencies 
are detected or reflected in legal decisions. Nancy Combs, for 
instance, has reviewed nearly all cases of the SCSL and some 
ICTY cases. Her study comes to the conclusion that ‘more than 
50 percent of prosecution witnesses appearing in these trials 
testified in a way that was seriously inconsistent with their 
pre-trial statements’.122 This finding does not necessarily call 
into question the final legal determinations. But it challenges 
the view that international criminal courts are particularly well 
equipped to carry out comprehensive fact-finding. 
At pre-trial, there is almost a move towards the other extreme. 
Pre-trial submissions and motions often rely on documentary 
evidence and supporting material in relation to key points.123 
Judges have limited fact-finding capacity. Judicial adjudication 
relies to a large extent on NGO reports, public documents, and 
summaries of evidence. The reliability and factual accuracy of 
these materials are often difficult to verify. 
In light of these factors, it seems difficult to present historical 
‘fact-finding’ as a primary objective of international criminal 
proceedings.124 Incidentally, judicial fact-finding has a highly 
pragmatic value - that is, an evidentiary use. It is inherent in 
juridical reasoning, with all its strengths and weaknesses. It 
also serves a certain pedagogical function. The judicial pro-
cess may, in particular, reduce the complexity of violence to a 
‘manageable narrative’.125 Robert Jackson framed it adequately 
at Nuremberg when he said that a trial might ‘establish incred-
ible events by credible evidence’.126 Experience from criminal 
trials shows that a single videotape, such as the film on Nazi 
concentration camps in Nuremberg or the scorpions footage 
in the Milošević trial, may have greater impact than an entire 
judgment, if rightly introduced and tested in court. Ultimately, 
‘judicial fact-finding’ might also limit the mystification of acts 
and perpetrators. Through their ‘evidentiary’ filters and their 
publicity, international criminal proceedings may render cer-
tain facts less contestable. In this way, they may leave less room 
for the ‘denial’ of atrocity.127 
But it would go a step too far to equate judicial fact-finding 
with accurate historiography, or even a broader ‘truth-finding’ 
procedure aimed at societal reconciliation. The acceptance and 
internalization of facts are processes that are shaped by other 
factors, such as media, inter-ethnic contact, or local politics.128 
This is evidenced by the experience of the ICTY in which the 
‘judicial truth’ established in The Hague often remained de-
tached from the ‘local truth’.129 
This result is not necessarily an institutional failure, but rather 
an indication of the limitations of international criminal jus-
tice. The key is to make ‘best use’ of the virtues of judicial fact-
finding. The record of international criminal courts will always 
remain selective. In recognition of this reality, the main task 
is to make the best use of selective knowledge and the quality 
(rather than the quantity) of facts and information. This does 
not mean that there is no room for improvement. 
One possible way to reduce gaps between international and 
domestic perception is the extension of channels to share 
evidence. Only a fraction of the evidence gathered by inter-
national investigators and prosecutors is currently used in 
international criminal proceedings. It should be rethought 
about whether and under what conditions this material can 
be shared more effectively with domestic jurisdiction or other 
fact-finding bodies.130 
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Second, further progress could be made in the analysis of judi-
cial records. One distinct advantage of witness testimony, doc-
uments, and transcripts lies in their recording and availability 
after completion of the trial. Unfortunately, this record is often 
so complex that even judges or defence counsel have difficul-
ties in processing it. A useful way to improve impact might be 
to systematize and order judicial records in a way that makes it 
more accessible for lawyers and non-lawyers in future research.
2.2.4. Legacy
This leads me to the last theme: if judicial truths remain partial 
and if judicial fact-finding carries an inevitable degree of un-
certainty, what remains? What is the legacy of these tribunals?
In the parable, the younger brother addresses this question to 
the returning son in the last of his conversations. The younger 
brother has witnessed the glorious welcome of his brother by 
the father: ‘I saw you come covered with glory’; ‘And I saw what 
our father did. He put a ring on your finger, a ring the like of 
which our brother does not have’ (p. 225). Like his brother, 
he is eager to depart from home, and wants to learn from his 
journey. He asks: ‘Did you find nothing but disappointments 
on your wanderings? Is all that I imagine outside and differ-
ent from here, only an illusion’? ‘Didn’t you mistake the road?’ 
(p. 229).
The returning son gives an encouraging reply. He admits some 
of his own failures (‘Yes, I feel it clearly now, I failed’ (p. 231)) 
but realizes that the journey marked a way to ‘find’ his younger 
brother (‘[without coming back] I would never have known 
you’ (p. 229)). He then encourages his younger brother to leave 
against the will of the mother, in order to enable him to make 
his own experiences (‘It is for me to admire you, and for you to 
forget me’ (p. 233)).
This dialogue captures the essence of the debate about ‘legacy’ 
in international criminal justice. What do tribunals leave be-
hind after completion of cases in a specific situation, or even 
after closing investigations and prosecutions in the entire situ-
ation?
Here, again, ‘realism’ contrasts with ‘expectations’ that are dif-
ficult to meet. There are increasing efforts to assess the ‘legacy’ 
and lessons learned from individual tribunals. Different organs 
within international criminal courts and tribunals (presidency, 
registry) work on ‘legacy’, in order to provide greater clarity 
on record and performance. Conferences and volumes are de-
voted to the theme.131 But there are hardly any agreed criteria 
to establish ‘legacy’132 or reliable methods to test it. In fact, the 
very notion is somewhat daring. ‘Legacy’ is not something that 
can be unilaterally construed or created. Rather, it depends 
on external judgement and develops incrementally over time. 
Emerging scholarship on the theme admits the limits of empir-
ical methods (e.g. the fragility of ‘population surveys’) and the 
subjectivity of judgement.133 A recent study on the impact of 
the ICTY, for instance, comes to the conclusion that ‘the level 
of support for the ICTY is lower in recent years than it was at 
the time the ICTY began its trials’134 and that its acceptance 
ranges from almost ‘non-existent’ in certain parts (Serbia) to 
overwhelming in others (Kosovo).135 Again, this finding is not 
so much a testimony of individual institutional failure. It rath-
er shows that it is essential to track how attitudes develop over 
time and to explore the rationales underlying such change136 in 
order to provide credible results. 
Currently, impact is mainly associated with two parameters, 
which bear resemblance with the main themes of ‘homecom-
ing’ in the parable, namely interaction with domestic entities 
(e.g. capacity-building) and reconciliation. I will deal with 
them consecutively. 
2.2.4.1. Capacity-building. There is a growing awareness that 
international justice is only sustainable if it is not only done 
internationally, but seen to be done in affected communities 
and followed by consecutive domestic action.137 This is a lesson 
learned from decades of UN experiences in peace-building. It 
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is gradually implemented in the field of international criminal 
justice. 
 
In the ad hoc tribunals, this move was born out of necessity. It 
resulted from the need to deal with a backlog of cases involv-
ing lower-level perpetrators. By now, the Yugoslavia Tribunal 
has referred more than ten cases to the Bosnian War Crimes 
Chamber.138 Rwanda abolished the death penalty in order to 
be eligible to receive cases.139 The ICC Statute contains a more 
systemic turn towards interaction between international and 
the domestic legal systems, by application of the principle of 
complementarity.140 The court is developing criteria to trans-
late this imperative into disengagement strategies in individual 
situations. This reflects a certain paradigm shift: international 
justice is no longer judged solely by its own investigation, trial, 
and sentences, but also by its ability and capacity to incentivize 
genuine domestic proceedings.141 
But real practice shows that the actual contribution is often 
difficult to assess. There is a great deal of disparity across situ-
ations and untested assumptions about cause and effect (e.g. 
catalytic effect).142 ICC intervention, for instance, has produced 
a wide range of vastly different effects on domestic commu-
nities.143 In some situations, such as Darfur or Kenya, it has 
predominantly shaped political discourse or transformed the 
political landscape.144 In other contexts (such as Colombia or 
the Democratic Republic of Congo), it has prompted some 
legal transformation or legal reform.145 This has produced very 
different results for distinct actors. 
In some cases, it has led to the disempowerment of armed 
groups or accepted political elites. In other instances, such as 
Uganda, it has been followed by the empowerment of political 
or religious leaders in the local sphere. In other situations, such 
as Palestine or the Korean U-boat incident, it had hardly any 
traceable effect.146 
With the further increase in situations and ongoing budgetary 
restraints (e.g. zero-growth budgets), there is an even greater 
risk that attention will shift too quickly from one ‘troubleshot’ 
to another, without lasting mitigation of the causes that trig-
gered justice intervention in the first place147 - as in decades of 
UN peace operations. 
This challenge may not be solved in the short term. But per-
haps a greater degree of modesty might actually produce better 
results. I will just provide two examples here.
Paul Seils, formerly Head of Situation Analysis in the ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor, has made this point powerfully in 
relation to the relationship between the ICC and domestic 
jurisdictions. He has argued that the ‘most positive thing’ the 
prosecutor can do at this stage in time to promote national 
proceedings is ‘to have a clear and consistent line on what he 
expects national prosecutions to produce within a reasonable 
time and to act without fear if what he expects does not mate-
rialize’.148 
Similarly, on a normative level, the strength of international 
criminal courts may rather lie in the persuasive power of ideas 
and legal obligations than in the imposition of rules and stand-
ards. Take the implementation of norms, for instance. Research 
on norm acceptance in conflict situations (e.g. Uganda149) 
shows that international standards require a certain degree of 
adaptability and ‘local’ translation in order to fit the specific 
context.150 International criminal courts may thus be best 
placed to highlight key issues and debates rather than seeking 
to engage in domestic reform.151 
2.2.4.2. Reconciliation. A similar logic applies in relation to 
‘reconciliation’. Whether and to what extent international 
criminal justice can successfully contribute to reconciliation is 
still an open question.152 According to statutory texts, recon-
ciliation is not expressly part of the mandate of international 
criminal courts.153 Proponents of restorative justice rightly 
point to the benefits of broader access to justice and victim 
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participation: victims can overcome trauma if the injustice 
done to them has been recognized publicly, if they receive an 
opportunity to make their personal story known, and if they 
themselves learn about the details of what has happened. Inter-
national criminal justice deserves to be praised for its progress 
in this area, which often goes further than in most domestic 
settings. 
But it is again difficult to judge the performance of interna-
tional criminal courts by their contribution to reconciliation. 
‘Judicial fact-finding’ and ‘outreach’ alone do not suffice to 
bring about ‘reconciliation’. They may sometimes even cause 
deeper divisions.154 Impact relies on other factors, such as me-
dia, inter-ethnic contact, positive experiences, etc.155 Research 
on the impact of the ICTY in the Balkans has shown that the 
attitudes of individuals in conflict or post-conflict settings are 
largely shaped by ‘group identity’ and perception of ‘victim-
hood’.156 More fundamentally, reconciliation pre-supposes 
that each group has a willingness to inquire into the extent 
to which it bears collective responsibility through the actions 
of its members and, in particular, its leadership. There is no 
guarantee that such a process will indeed effectively take place. 
Examples of Germany or Serbia show that society often takes a 
very long time to recognize the moral wrong committed and to 
condemn its own involvement in it.157 
Therefore, many experts caution rightly against overambitious 
expectations in relation to the role and impact of international 
trials on reconciliation.158 
3. Reconciling ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ 
Where does this lead us? I would argue that the proper ‘home-
coming’ of international criminal justice requires differentiated 
thinking concerning the relationship between ‘faith’ and ‘fact’. 
As in our parable, the key appears to lie in a better match 
between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’. Like the returning son, who 
spent part of his heritage on the way, our object of inquiry may 
require a greater degree of ‘realism’ in order to find his proper 
place between international law and domestic jurisdictions. At 
the same time, the ‘domestic’ might benefit from a greater de-
gree of ‘idealism’, as illustrated by the impact of the returning 
son on the younger brother. Or, to put it more concretely, in-
ternational criminal justice might benefit from a greater degree 
of realism, while domestic justice might embrace - as Stephane 
Bibas and William Burke White put it rightly - a greater dose 
of ‘idealism’.159 Achieving this balance requires a better inter-
play between ‘international’, ‘domestic’, and ‘local’ responses to 
conflict.
3.1. International criminal justice and ‘realism’
Let me start with the first argument. In line with the tenor of 
Gide’s treatment of the theme, I would argue that the journey 
of international criminal justice over the past decades is not 
a ‘loss’ or ‘failure’, but a process of ‘homecoming’. In order to 
enable a better embedding (i.e. a successful ‘homecoming’), it 
is necessary to recognize the limits of the discipline. The num-
ber of cases tried will remain limited and charges will remain 
selective. International criminal justice will not be able to meet 
all expectations. Tribunals try to individualize guilt. Victims 
and affected communities have partly contrasting prerogatives, 
such as the question as to what extent judgements or decision 
recognize victimhood of a broader group or collectivity, or 
a specific narrative of conflict. Impact will always be hard to 
assess in light of the discrepancies between accepted and non-
accepted goals and the lack of fully quantifiable indicators or 
assessment methods. Attitudes and behaviours are shaped by 
non-controllable factors. These limitations are not necessarily 
institutional failures, but inherent in the very project.
3.1.1. The role of expressivism
The challenge is to make better use of these limitations. One key 
element in this process is the improvement in the ‘expressive 
function’ of international criminal courts.160 By this, I do not 
mean a sheer strengthening of outreach or an increase in the 
‘show’ dimensions of trials (which are, in reality, mostly rather 
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dry and technical exercises), but a broader vision of the func-
tion of proceedings. International courts have a more ‘attentive 
public’ than most other judicial entities.161 They have a ‘global 
reach’ and ‘audience’. Like supreme courts or other highest judi-
ciaries in a domestic system, their strength and virtue may lie in 
their ability to ‘send messages’, shape debates and discourse, and 
influence the generation and perception of norms.162 
Expressivism can be partly traced back to the Nuremberg trials, 
which were associated with the idea that judicial proceedings 
are a key instrument in transforming society in post-war Ger-
many.163 Today, this approach is as relevant as ever in interna-
tional criminal justice. International criminal courts cannot 
merely be judges by their quantitative record. They are, most 
of all, entities that frame controversies and issues, highlight the 
value of norms, or send signals.164 Expressivism places some of 
their perceived weaknesses in relation to ‘effectiveness’, ‘fairness’, 
and ‘impact’ into perspective and allows them to make best use 
of their limitations.
Let us consider ‘selectivity’. Expressive theories do not deny 
capacity limits or inherent contradictions (i.e. the fact that 
condemnation does not reach all individual perpetrators). They 
seek to mitigate existing ‘selectivity’ and ‘enforcement’ prob-
lems, by relying on the power of transparency and persuasion 
of international criminal courts to denounce the wrong and 
reinforce society’s norms. This makes it more difficult for ‘big 
and powerful actors’ to ignore atrocities.165 Expressivism also 
addresses some fairness dilemmas. It does not ignore ‘fairness’ 
dilemmas inside international criminal justice, but places em-
phasis on the importance of the ‘demonstration effect’ - that is, 
the visibility and perception of independence and impartiality. 
In this sense, it seeks to enhance conditions under which inter-
national proceedings may serve as an example for national or 
local justice. Expressivism further reduces some of the narrative 
dilemmas, which are inherent in the rendering of international 
justice. It takes into account that there may be ‘multiple’ stories 
or version of ‘truth’ in society. Rather than denying this reality, 
it relies on the pedagogical function of judicial fact-finding and 
evidence to sharpen perceptions. This moderation is funda-
mental at a time at which international criminal justice is under 
criticism for failing to meet some of its projected objectives. 
3.1.2. ‘Realism’ and ‘faith’
A new ‘realism’ implies at the same time the need to recognize 
the limits of ‘facts’ and the virtues of ‘faith’. As David Koller put 
it so aptly: ‘Rather than simply dismissing … faith as irrational, 
we can learn a great deal about international criminal law and 
its prospects by seeking to understand the motivations for and 
the tenets of faith’.166
There is a need to resist the temptation to measure ‘success’ or 
‘failure’ ‘merely by rationalist theories’. Costs and benefits can-
not be judged solely by rational choice theory or empirical facts. 
As has been shown above, factual and normative judgements 
are interrelated in international criminal justice, as in hardly 
any other area. It is thus too simplistic to deny the role of ‘faith’ 
in this context. In fact, the project still enjoys support precisely 
because many believe that it is better to live with it than without 
it.167 This should not be ignored, but is part of reality. 
3.2. Domestic justice and ‘idealism’
This leads me to my second argument. While international 
criminal justice might thus merit some greater ‘realism’, do-
mestic justice might, in turn, benefit from greater ‘idealism’.168 
One of the virtues of international criminal justice lies in its 
transparency and its highly developed ‘culture’ of informal ac-
countability. Domestic justice differs in this respect. Although 
some high-level cases receive wide attention, many aspects of 
investigations and prosecutions receive little public scrutiny. 
Developing a more elaborate culture of transparency might be 
one of the incentives being derived from international criminal 
justice.
Second, domestic procedures might benefit from some of the 
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experiences and approaches in the international context. Inter-
national criminal justice has been a laboratory of procedural 
innovation in the past decades, due to its need to accommo-
date diversity and to balance the features of inquisitorial and 
accusatory traditions.169 There is something to learn from this 
experience, in both the national and the broader European 
contexts.170 I will just provide one example: the approach to-
wards the ‘restorative dimension’ of justice.
International criminal courts have greatly invested in the 
strengthening restorative features of proceedings, such as in-
creased information and access of victims to justice, outreach 
to affected communities, the determination of reparation 
to collectivities, or best practices to deal with gender-related 
violence or violence against children. Domestic systems might 
benefit from these experiences, be it in the context of domestic 
trials of atrocity crimes, which might involve a large number 
of victims, or in lower-level crimes in which informal social 
pressure or victim-offender mediation might deserve greater 
attention.
3.3. Reconciling the two
How can the relationship between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ be 
improved? I would argue that a partial shift in perspective is 
necessary in order to facilitate a better ‘match’. 
First, it is important to reconsider the ‘constituency’ of interna-
tional criminal justice.171 In the past, many choices have been 
made at the international level, with a focus on ‘international 
community’ or state interests. A proper ‘homecoming’ requires 
a pluralist vision - that is, a more systematic turn to individual 
and people’s interests. To be regarded as legitimate, and to in-
crease its persuasion, justice by international courts must also 
be ‘seen as local justice’.172 This shift in perspective (i.e. to treat 
‘locals’ as subjects rather than as objects) is essential to counter 
some of the contemporary criticisms of international criminal 
courts, such as the ‘neo-imperial’ nature or their detachment 
from domestic communities.
Second, it is necessary to work towards a better communica-
tion between global, national, and local audiences.173 Interna-
tional criminal justice is a two-way street: to The Hague and 
from The Hague. It is necessary to improve the conditions 
of this dialogue. In order to ensure better communication, it 
is essential not to seek a mere imitation of international ap-
proaches in the domestic sphere, but to work towards a better 
‘translation’ into the specific ‘national’ or ‘local’ context.174
4. Not a conclusion
It is apparent that these challenges are too important to be left 
to lawyers alone, or to a single discipline. We live in a world 
in which the very meaning of ‘justice’ is reaching new bound-
aries and horizons. In the reality of today, the ‘justice’ ideal 
extends beyond far beyond criminal law or domestic legal 
systems. Justice plays a key role in the promotion or protec-
tion of broader ‘global public goods’, such as collective security, 
development or environmental protection, or fairness in in-
ternational norms and institutions more broadly. Here again, 
in this emerging domain of ‘global justice’, it is fundamental to 
establish forms of communication and modes of interaction 
in which the ‘international’, the ‘domestic’ and the ‘local’ can 
meet. 
The new Chair is set up in this spirit. It is meant to build 
‘bridges’: 
- bridges between criminal justice and international law, 
- bridges between academia and the professional community, 
- bridges between Leiden and the community in The Hague,
- bridges between International Justice and the broader 
aspira-tion of ‘global
- justice, and bridges across over disciplines. 
It will be difficult to construct ‘physical’ bridges, as one of 
my predecessors did. But perhaps there is space to establish 
lasting ‘normative’ bridges. Together with the Grotius Cen-
tre, and our partners, here and abroad, will at least try, in 
our educational programmes in Public International Law, 
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and in the framework of the two NWO research projects 
on ‘Post Conflict Justice and Local Ownership’ and ‘Jus 
Post Bellum’. 
5. Vote of Thanks
Let me now pass on to the final part of my lecture - a word of 
appreciation. I would like to pay special tribute to the Board of 
the University, in particular the Rector Magnificus of the Uni-
versity, Professor Paul van der Heijden, and the Law Faculty 
and the Faculty Campus The Hague. It is an honour that both 
are represented by their Deans today. Without their warm wel-
come, their gratitude and support, this chair and today would 
not be possible.
For my further words, I would like to pass on the logic of the 
parable. Just like this toga presents an abstraction, I wish to 
thank symbolically. 
I wish to thank:
-  those who built the ‘house’, and those without whom I 
would not be here,
-  those who make it such a wonderful experience and pleas-
ure to be here, be it through collegiality, inspiration, con-
versation or friendship,
-  those who keep loyalty, trust and friendship when I occa-
sionally desert from ‘the house,
-  those who have crossed continents or countries to be here 
today, and who continue believe in the ‘house’, even though 
reality or routine might make this difficult. 
I would also like thank those with whom we will continue to 
build the ‘house’, and those who are here today ‘in spirit’. 
Finally, I would like to express my particular gratitude and ap-
preciation to the students: They are a source of inspiration. It 
is an honour to teach them, and to learn from them. 
This brings me to my closing words. I wish to close these 
reflections on ‘constituency’ and ‘dialogue’ with the ‘shift of 
perspective’ reflected in the final conversation between the de-
parting brother and the returning son in our parable: this time, 
the younger brother says: 
‘Do you know why I was expecting you this evening? … You 
opened the way for me’ (p. 233).
The ‘prodigal son’ replies: ‘It is time now. The sky turns pale …. 
Go quietly. I am holding the lamp’ (p. 233).
Ik heb gezegd.
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held on 31 October 2011, published in article format as 
a 25th anniversary editorial in (2012) 25 LJIL 251 - 282. It 
is part of a larger research project entitled ‘Post-Conflict 
Justice and Local Ownership’, carried out under the 
auspices of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific 
Research. I wish to thank Larissa van den Herik, Joseph 
Powderly, Dov Jacobs,  Jens Iverson and Kees Waaldijk for 
their comments and input. 
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